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1R¶ esum¶ e
Cet article ¶ evalue l'impact de la politique ¯scale des ¶ Etats-Unis sur la stabilisation du
cycle ¶ economique. On utilise un modµ ele de cycle r¶ eel avec des imp^ ots distorsifs sur les
revenus du capital et du travail, et on suppose que les imp^ ots r¶ epondent aux variations
cycliques de l'activit¶ e. L'analyse est conduite en utilisant des techniques bay¶ esiennes. Les
principaux r¶ esultats sont les suivants : (a) la politique ¯scale a suivi un comportement
contracyclique, (b) ce comportement a aid¶ e µ a r¶ eduire la volatilit¶ e du PIB, de la consommation
et du investissement et (c) les chocs non anticip¶ es de politique ¯scale n'ont pas a®ect¶ es la
volatilit¶ e des variables macro¶ economiques.
Mots cl¶ es : Politique ¯scale, Cycle ¶ economique, M¶ ethodes bay¶ esiennes.
JEL: E32, E62, C11, C22.
Abstract
I study whether US Tax Policies a®ected economic volatility during the post World War II
period. I employ a Real Business Cycle model with distorting taxation on household income
and tax rules, and assume that taxes respond to the cyclical conditions of the economy.
I estimate the deep parameters of the model using Bayesian techniques. My ¯ndings are;
(a) tax policies display a strong procyclical behavior, (b) help to reduce the cyclical and
raw volatility of GDP, consumption, investment when the government can issue debt, and
(c) unexpected changes in tax policies do not a®ect the volatility of the macroeconomic
variables.
Keywords: Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles, Bayesian Methods.
JEL: E32, E62, C11, C22.
21 Introduction
Can ¯scal adjustment change the features of the Business Cycle ? Is it true that a counter-
cyclical ¯scal policy helps to smooth °uctuations ? Which °uctuations, raw and/or cyclical
? These topics have been at the center of public discussion in the past two decades. In
Europe, because of the creation of a single currency area and the relinquishment of national
monetary policy, the debate has focused on the role of national ¯scal policy and the nature
of the Stability and Growth Pact. In this respect, Gali and Perotti (2004) ask whether after
the Maastricht Treaty national ¯scal policies have become less countercyclical, and they ¯nd
no evidence to support this view. In the US, few years ago a Treasury Department study
concluded that the absence of automatic stabilizers at the peak of the US recession in 2001
would have added an additional 1.5 million people to the ranks of the unemployed. More-
over, a consideration clearly in°uencing recent policy decisions as of the beginning of 2009, if
not in earlier years, is the zero-nominal-interest rate bound facing monetary policy. Thus, a
renovated activism on ¯scal policy to ¯ght the recent crises brought governments to rethink
the role of ¯scal policy (see Auerbach (2009)).
At the core of this debate there is the Keynesian prescription that a countercyclical ¯scal
policy has stabilizing e®ects that work through both automatic stabilizers and occasionally
discretionary actions; many economists share this view1. At the opposite end of the debate,
some recent studies question the stabilizing role of ¯scal policies. Jones (2002) shows em-
pirically that post war ¯scal policy did not help the US economy to smooth Business Cycle
°uctuations, for example. From a theoretical standpoint, Gordon and Leeper (2005) highlight
that countercyclical ¯scal policy might amplify recessions through the policy expectations
channel.
In this paper, I revisit the issue of whether ¯scal policy matters for business cycle °uctu-
ations and ask whether US tax policy has been an important source for economic volatility,
and (if so) at which frequencies is the tax instrument more important. I assume that taxes re-
spond to cyclical conditions of the economy by reacting to economic °uctuations. I estimate
the deep parameters of the model from a vector of time series using Bayesian techniques.
The main ¯ndings read as follows. First, consistent with the less structural analysis of
Romer and Romer (2007) and Cohen and Follette (2000), US tax policies display a strong
procyclical reaction to GDP or employment in the period considered. Second, while with a
balanced budget assumption and non lump sum transfers the procyclical tax behavior has
1Blinder and Solow (1973), Romer and Romer (1994), Romer (1999), Cohen and Follette (2000), Auerbach
(2003).
3little room to stabilize the economy, with a government budget constrain with debt it acts
as an important stabilizing device. Indeed, when government can non access to lump sum
taxation but can issue debt the automatic response of the labor and capital tax to cyclical
conditions reduces the volatility of consumption, GDP, investment. This is true regardless
of the horizon that we look at, and in particular counterfactuals with raw and cyclical simu-
lated data provide the similar conclusions. Unexpected changes in taxes generate very little
economic volatility especially at business cycles frequencies.
For the purpose of this paper, one of the most delicate issues is the de¯nition of a policy
rule that summarizes the evolution of tax over time. As explained in Gali and Perotti (2004),
the ¯scal response function can be seen as the combination of a cyclical component and a
structural or discretionary component; the ¯rst part comprises all the variations outside the
direct control of the ¯scal authority (like changes in the tax base). The second part should
be interpreted as the part which is intentionally chosen by the policymaker, as in Fat¶ as
and Mihov (2001). Within this discretionary part, there is an endogenous or systematic
response by which the policymaker automatically responds to cyclical economic conditions
and there is a non-systematic or exogenous component. The former component arises from
spending programs and tax cut that adjust systematically with economic conditions. The
latter captures all the changes that do not correspond to systematic variations to cyclical
conditions; we can interpret these exogenous changes as actions that are meant to sustain or
fasten long run growth (Romer and Romer (2007)), or changes in the political process (Gali
and Perotti (2004)). This paper attempts to estimate these two components from the data.
There are di®erent ¯scal instruments that could be taken into consideration. For instance,
Fatas and Mihov (2006) consider government spending. Gali and Perotti (2004) or Auerbach
(2003) instead consider the primary de¯cit. Jones (2002) considers average tax rates and
government spending. Here I focus on tax policies and government debt and I deliberately
ignore government spending as a ¯scal instrument. The reason for that is that government
expenditure is rather in°exible and while it can be easily increased it is very di±cult to
decrease it. This cast doubts on its validity as a stabilizing tool.
Several empirical studies have used VAR techniques to address the issue of interest in
this paper; Mountford and Uhlig (forthcoming) study the transmission mechanism of ¯scal
shocks. Canova and Pappa (2007) and Perotti (2002) shows that government spending has
a signi¯cant output multiplier. There are endogenous feedbacks between economic activity
and tax policies; on the one hand, taxes directly a®ect household consumption and labor
decisions, and therefore economic activity. On the other hand, the ¯scal authority sets tax
4policies by looking at the economic activity. Given the strong endogenous relations between
household decisions and tax policy, I choose to employ a general equilibrium framework.
There are several papers that look at ¯scal policies in a general equilibrium framework.
McGrattan (1994) estimates the ¯scal response from a vector of autoregression considering
a broad general class of ¯scal responses; she concludes that a relevant portion of business
cycles °uctuations is due to ¯scal instruments. Braun (1994) estimates in a GE model
the reaction function of ¯scal instruments, taxes and government spending. Jones (2002)
estimates various ¯scal policy rules form the US postwar data. I complement their analysis
by introducing debt in the model and as a measurable variable and by ruling out lump sum
transfers. Furthermore, I consider proxies for the marginal tax rates using Mendoza, Razin
and Tesar (1994) methodology, where marginal tax rate are are constructed using national
accounts and revenue statistics2.
Following a standard practice in the literature of DSGE models I estimate structural
parameters using a Bayesian approach. Bayesian techniques have gained a predominant role
for the DSGE models estimation, representing ideally the toolkit of every applied researcher,
see An and Schorfheide (2007). There are several reasons for that. First, the Bayesian
paradigm provides a coherent framework to treat model uncertainty and to take decisions
based on risk. Second, while not treated as the 'true' data generating process, DSGE models
are just considered as an approximation of the law of motion for the data. Third, Bayesian
estimators have desirable properties in small samples. Fourth, priors allow to incorporate
external information to the model and to consistently combine pre-sample information with
the observed data.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. The estimation pro-
cedure is described in Section 3. Section 4 discusses di®erent speci¯cations and Section 5
presents the results and the model ¯t. Section 6 draws policy implications and Section 7
concludes.
2The method allows to compute time series of e®ective tax rates on consumption, capital income, and
labor income using information publicly available from the national accounts. The three rates are measured
as ad-valorem estimates by classifying virtually all forms of tax revenue at the general government level into
one of the three taxes. Each measure of tax revenue is then expressed as a fraction of a precise estimate of
the corresponding tax base. These ad-valorem tax rates re°ect speci¯c (or per-unit) tax rates faced by a
representative agent in a general equilibrium framework.
52 Model
I employ a prototype RBC model with no frictions and with a time varying 'wedge' on labor
and capital accumulation, and an e±ciency 'wedge' on the production side. Chari, Kehoe
and McGrattan (2007) have shown that this prototype economy is equivalent to a large class
of models with various types of frictions and can reasonably well account for the U.S. postwar
Business Cycle °uctuations.
The model consists of a single representative ¯rm, a representative household, and a govern-
ment. The ¯rm and the household behave in the standard fashion; the ¯rm maximizes pro¯t,
and the household maximizes its discounted lifetime utility. The government, on the other
hand, does not have an objective function and it has to ¯nance an exogenous expenditure
process using distortionary taxation and issuing real debt. I postulate a budget constraint
that permits borrowing but rules out lump sum taxation an drequires that borrowing satisfy
stability restrictions using parametric feedback rules for the tax rate.
The supply side of the economy is very stylized. The numeraire is ¯nal output Yt, which







where Kt¡1 and Nt denote the capital and labor available at time t, respectively. At is the
exogenous stochastic technology process. I assume
at = ½at¡1 + ²
a
t;
where at = lnAt, and ²a
t is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and variance ¾2
a. By perfect
competition assumption, the cost of renting capital, rt, and real wages, wt, are equal to their
marginal products, i.e. wt = (1 ¡ ®) Yt
Nt and rt = ® Yt
Kt¡1.
On the demand side, the economy is populated by a single representative household who














where ¯ is the time discount factor and 1=´ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution;
Ct;Nt are respectively consumption and hours worked at time t. All the variables are ex-
pressed in per capita terms. Xt is an exogenous preference shock which evolves according
to
Ât = ½ÂÂt¡1 + ²
Â
t
6where Ât = lnXt and ²
Â
t is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and variance ¾2
Â. The representative
household faces a budget constraint,
It + Ct + Bt = (1 ¡ ¿
w
t )wtNt + (1 ¡ ¿
k
t )rtKt¡1 + (1 + r
b
t)Bt¡1 (3)
I indicate with ¿w
t and ¿k
t the taxes on labor and capital income, respectively; Bt¡1 is the
real debt issued by the government at time t ¡ 1 which gives a net interest rate of rb
t. I
assume also that the law of motion of capital is
VtIt = Kt ¡ (1 ¡ ±)Kt¡1 (4)
where ± is the rate of depreciation of capital and Vt is an investment speci¯c shock which
follows an AR(1) process, i.e.
vt = ½vvt¡1 + ²
v
t
where vt = lnVt, and ²v
t is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and variance ¾2
v. The representative
household problem is to maximize (2) subject to the budget constraint (3) and (4); the ¯rst
order conditions for the household problem are
C
´
t = (1 ¡ ¿
w

























Equation (5) is the intra-temporal optimality condition between consumption and leisure;
equation (6) is the usual Euler equation and Rt is net depreciation after tax interest rate.
Equation (8) is the intertemporal optimality condition for debt demand. In equilibrium, it
must be the case that the no arbitrage condition between the after tax interest rate and the






] = 1 + r
b
t (9)
The government satis¯es a period by period budget constraint,




t wtNt + ¿
k
t rtKt¡1 + Bt (10)
where Gt is government spending. The literature considers several speci¯cations for the
¯scal policy instruments. Some authors consider government spending as an instrument
7that stimulates private consumption (see Gal¶ ³, L¶ opez-Salido and Vall¶ es (2007)). My goal
here is to study the ability of taxes to a®ect the Business Cycle. Moreover, government
expenditure is rather in°exible and while it can be easily increased it is very di±cult to
decrease it. Therefore, I postulate that the government spending evolves as AR(1) process,
gt = ½ggt¡1 + ²
g
t
where gt = lnGt and ²
g
t is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and variance ¾2
g. As mentioned, the
¯scal literature de¯nes the ¯scal rule as a combination of two main elements; an endogenous
automatic response to the economic conditions, through which the policymaker reacts au-
tomatically to cyclical conditions and an exogenous component meant to be an unexpected
reply to economic cycles. The feedback rule is terpreted as the change in the tax codes that
induce changes in the tax rate. In line with this literature, I assume that the tax deviation
from its steady state responds to the GDP log deviations from its steady state and to the
debt-GDP deviation; the latter variable is included in order to avoid explosive paths of gov-
ernment debt. It is also common to include lagged value of the taxes to account for sluggish
reaction of the ¯scal instrument. Rules governing tax policies3 take the following form:
e ¿
w
t = 'by e byt + 'we ¿
w





t = Ãby e byt + Ãke ¿
k









t ¡¿j, for j = w;k, e byt is
the deviation of the debt-GDP ratio from its steady state, i.e. e byt = Bt=Yt ¡B=Y , and yt is
the log deviation of the GDP from its steady state, i.e. yt = ln Yt
Y . ²
j
t are i.i.d policy shocks
with zero mean and variance ¾2
j, with j = w;k.
Finally, total output is absorbed by private and public consumption and investments, i.e.
Yt = It + Ct + Gt
3 Estimation strategy
The DSGE model presented is log linearized around a non stochastic steady state and solved,
where variables in deviation from their steady states are interpreted as a relevant measure





t + ½{(µ){t+1 (13)
3Other speci¯cations for the FP rule are considered in the following sections.
8where ½y(µ) and ½{(µ) are matrixes which are function of the structural parameters of the
DSGE model, µ = [®;´;±; K
Y ;¿w;¿k;'w;'by;'y;Ãk;Ãby;Ãy;½a;½g;½Â;½v]. {t+1 is the vector of
structural innovations whose variance covariance matrix is diagonal and has on the its main








mk]. ¾mw and ¾mk are the standard deviations of
measurement shocks on the marginal tax rates4.
The model describes the behavior of several variables and it is assumed that eight variables
are observed: real GDP, consumption, investment, hour worked, labor and capital taxes,
government debt and government spending from 1966q3 to 2007q2. Details on data con-


































































































Figure 1: Log of Real GDP, consumption, investment, hour worked, labor and capital taxes
and government debt and government spending from 1966q3 to 2007q2. First and second
rows raw data, third and last rows linear detrended data, hp ¯ltered data and ¯rst di®erence
data.
standard practice to assume a unit root behavior for the technology process to account for
the long run movements of the data. This assumption implies that real variables grow at
the same rate, the technology rate, and real data in ¯rst di®erence has a direct counterparts
with real model-based variables in ¯rst di®erence (plus a noise). Usually, only real and nom-
4Since I describe the evolution of eight observable variables, I need to introduce measurement errors to
avoid stochastic singularity. Since marginal tax rate are the variables that are more 'latent' and less directly
observable, I decided to attach a measurement error on them.
5See for instance An and Schorfheide (2007), Smets and Wouters (2007) or Del Negro, Schoerfheide,
Smets and Wouters (2007).
9inal variable are considered, and quantities such as debt-GDP ratio, marginal tax rates and
government spending are typically not included in the set of observable variables. In un-
dertaking this task many problems arise. First, each series displays di®erent upward trends
and low frequencies movements. Looking at the data plotted in the ¯rst two rows of Figure
1, 'eyeballs econometric' revels that each series displays very idiosyncratic pattern both at
low and medium frequencies. Standard model based ¯ltering is not implementable since
the likelihood is ill behaved using the raw series of debt-GDP ratio, marginal tax rates and
government spending. While a possible option is to ¯lter the data, how to extract cyclical
information from the raw series is not a trivial question. Indeed, the third and fourth lines
of Figure 1 display the linear detrended, HP ¯ltered and ¯rst di®erence data. Clearly, cycles
are statistically di®erent across di®erent ¯lters. For the sake of the argument, consider the
debt-GDP ratio ¯ltered with a linear detrending and an HP ¯lter: an HP ¯lter on debt-GDP
ratio (fourth row seventh column) produces cycles with an average periodicity of 10 quarters
from peak to peak, whereas linear detrended debt-GDP ratio (second row seventh column)
displays cycles with a periodicity of 100 quarters ! Moreover di®erent ¯lters produce di®erent
posterior distributions of the parameters and thus di®erent conclusions for the model (see
Canova and Ferroni (2008) or Canova (2008)).
The approach I consider here adopts an `hybrid' setup, where I specify a structural
model fro the cyclical °uctuations of the data and a reduce from setup for the non cyclical
movements of the data. Following Ferroni (2009), structural and non structural parameters
are jointly estimated in a signal extraction framework. The estimation strategy assumes that
data, yt, is made up of a non-stationary trend component, y¿












It is assumed that the log linearized model provides a good approximation of the cyclical










t + ½{(µ){t+1 (16)
y
¿
t = F(yt) (17)
6Since marginal tax rates and debt-GDP ratio are variables bounded to be between 0 and 1, taking logs
make little sense. Also in the log linearization of the model these variables are rewriten in terms of deviation
from the steady state.
10where S is a selection matrix that picks the model variables that are observables, and F(yt)
is the ¯lter that extracts the trend y¿
t from the data. Let
Flt : y
¿
t = A + B ¤ t + ´t (18)
Ffd : y
¿





t + ¹t (20)
¹t+1 = ¹t + ³t+1
where equation (18) postulates a linear trend, equation (19) a unit root, and equation (20) a
smooth integrated of order II random walk. ´t and ³t are independent zero mean shocks with
diagonal covariance matrices, §´ and §³ respectively. For each trend speci¯cation, there is
a set of non-structural parameters to be estimated: for the linear trend #lt = [A;B;§´], for
the unit root #fd = [°;§´], and for the smooth integrated of order II random walk #hp = §³.
Harvey and Jaeger (1993) show that the random walk of order II (equations (20)) is equiv-
alent to a Hodrey Prescott trend where the smoothing parameter is the ratio between the
variance of cycles and the variance of the second di®erence of the trend.
It is easy to show that the system of of equations (14)-(17) can be cast into a linear state
space, whose likelihood can be computed using the Kalman ¯lter.
Parameters, º = [µ;#], are estimated using Bayesian methods. Given the DSGE model, M,
and a trend speci¯cation, F , posterior distributions of the parameters is proportional to the
product of prior and sample information, so that
p(º j y;M;F) / p(º)L(y j º;M;F)
where p(º) is the prior distribution of the parameters, and L(y j º;M;F) is the likelihood of
raw data computed with the Kalman ¯lter. Given the large number of parameter involved,
there is no analytical solution and simulation methods are needed. In particular, I used
Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) methods. The main idea of MCMC simulators is to
de¯ne a transition distribution for the parameters that induce an ergodic Markov chain.
After a large number of iterations, draws obtained from the chain are draws from the lim-
iting target distribution (see Schorfheide (2000), DeJong, Ingram and Whiteman (2000) or
Canova (2007) Ch 9). I run 600,000 draws for each speci¯cation and I tune up the RWM
variance in order to achieve a 30%-40% acceptance rate. Convergence for all the parameters
is achieved after 300,000 draws 7.
7To save space, convergence diagnostics are not presented here, but they are available upon request.
11I brie°y discuss the prior selection. I ¯x the depreciation rate to 0.025, which implies
an annual depreciation rate of 10%, and estimate the remaining parameters. In Table 4, I
report the parameters description and the priors assumptions. Following standard practice,
I choose Beta distributions for those parameters that must lie within the unit interval, like
capital share or steady state taxes. The persistence parameters of the AR(1) processes are
assumed to follow a Beta distribution as well, with mean 0.7 and standard deviation 0.1.
The Beta distribution covers the range between 0 and 1, but a small standard error was used
to have a clearer separation between stationary and non stationary shocks, as in Smets and
Wouters (2003). For the coe±cient of relative risk aversion, ´, I pick a Gamma distribution
with mean 2.5, which implies an intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1=´, of 0.4, close to
the RBC literature values. Standard deviations are assumed to be distributed as Uniform
with 0-1 support. For the ¯scal policy parameters I choose Normal distributions centered
at positive values, 0.2, with a large standard deviation, 0.5. This implies that a priori ¯scal
policies are countercyclical on average but there is a positive probability that the coe±cients
are negative. About the trend parameters, I use uniform priors for standard deviations and
normal with large variance for drifts or slopes.
4 Trend and Fiscal Policy speci¯cations
As mentioned, ¯scal policy rules are linear combinations of automatic stabilizers and unex-
pected changes. The literature suggests two possible interpretation of the automatic response
of policy maker to cyclical conditions. First, we could interpret tax variations as changes
in the legislation process. The second interpretation hinges on variations of tax codes that
induce changes in the tax rate over the business cycles. Given the volatile proxies for the
average tax rate, only the second interpretation makes sense8. Moreover, the broad de¯nition
of tax policy leaves space for arbitrariness in writing down the exact ¯scal policy function.
For instance, Jones (2002) de¯nes the (log deviation from the steady state) labor and capital
tax as a linear combination of present and lagged values of GDP, hours worked and lagged
values of taxes and government consumption. Davig and Leeper (2007) let the (deviation
from the steady state) tax depend on the past level of debt-GDP ratio, current GPD, govern-
ment consumption. In Gali and Perotti (2004), the primary de¯cit responds to the expected
value of output gap, to debt, to the past level of the de¯cit and an orthogonal shock. To
account for this variety, I experiment with di®erent possibilities. The speci¯cations that I
8I thank a referee for pointing this out.
12consider are
² Taxes respond to GDP, S1:
e ¿
w
t = 'we ¿
w





t = Ãke ¿
k
t¡1 + Ãyyt + Ãby e byt + ²
k
t
² Taxes respond to employment, S2:
e ¿
w
t = 'we ¿
w





t = Ãke ¿
k
t¡1 + Ãnnt + Ãby e byt + ²
k
t
² Taxes respond to lagged GDP, S3:
e ¿
j
t = 'we ¿
j





t = Ãke ¿
k
t¡1 + Ãyyt¡1 + Ãby e byt + ²
k
t
² Taxes respond to expected GDP as in Gali and Perotti (2004), S4:
e ¿
w
t = 'we ¿
w





t = Ãke ¿
k
t¡1 + ÃyEtyt+1 + Ãby e byt + ²
k
t
The rationale behind these speci¯cations is twofold: (a) test which is the most likely cyclical
indicator for ¯scal policy rule among GDP or employment, (b) search for the correct timing
of the ¯scal policy reaction to changes in the cyclical conditions, i.e. past, current or expected
cyclical changes a®ect today tax.
To test among di®erent speci¯cations I use Posterior Odd ratios. The Posterior Odds ratio
is constructed by comparing the Bayes Factor, which is the ratio of the predictive densities
of the data conditional on di®erent models, and prior odds, which is the ratio of prior
probabilities associated to each model. Given a prior p(º), the predictive density of the













where p(S1;Flt) and p(S2;Flt) are prior probabilities on the non cyclical component and
¯scal policy speci¯cation.
14Acc Prior p(yjSk;Fm) ln(POk;mjS1;lt)
S1 & lt 25.95 1/12 2367.2 0.0
S1 & hp 24.82 1/12 4018.3 1651.1
S1 & fd 44.66 1/12 4061.6 1694.4
S2 & lt 27.36 1/12 2347.1 -20.1
S2 & hp 18.43 1/12 3946.7 1579.5
S2 & fd 25.49 1/12 3373.9 1006.8
S3 & lt 26.77 1/12 2344.5 -22.6
S3 & hp 27.35 1/12 3942.9 1575.7
S3 & fd 32.26 1/12 3633.3 1266.2
S4 & lt 26.17 1/12 2356.6 -10.6
S4 & hp 27.66 1/12 3963.2 1596.0
S4 & fd 34.22 1/12 3880.4 1513.2
Table 1: Marginal Likelihood, Posterior Odds with respect to the linear trend and speci¯ca-
tion for each speci¯cation.
Table 1 reports the Posterior Odds for each speci¯cation and for each trend speci¯cation.
First thing that stands out is the poor relative ¯t of the linear trend speci¯cation compared
to other non cyclical component speci¯cations, independently on the ¯scal policy. While HP
or ¯rst di®erence ¯lters are relatively comparable, a linear detrended ¯lter has a posterior
density of the data much lower than the other ¯lters. This is true for each ¯scal policy
speci¯cation. This is not surprising by looking at cycles extracted by a linear trend. As
mentioned, linear detrended debt-GDP ratio displays cycles with large periodicity (second
row seventh column in Figure 1), of roughly 100 quarters, and the remaining linear detrended
variables do not display similar periodicity. This clearly unbalances the likelihood since the
¯ltered data has di®erent times series properties.
Second thing to notice is that no matter what ¯lter we use, the speci¯cation S1 is always
preferred over the remaining speci¯cations; so, if we use a linear trend we would choose S1,
same for a unit root or a II order random walk. This is an important result because it
means that the choice of the ¯scal policy speci¯cation is independent on the way in which
we extract the cyclical information from the data.
Therefore, concerning the two questions of interest (namely, the choice of the cyclical indi-
cator and timing of the reaction), with a 0-1 loss function the PO ratios reveals that the set
up with S1 and fd is the preferred one. Therefore, the ¯scal policy and trend speci¯cation I
15discuss and adopt for policy experiments is the unit root speci¯cation for raw data with a
¯scal policy rule that responds to contemporaneous variations9.
5 Parameters Estimates and Moments
In this section I discuss the posterior estimates of the parameters and the model ¯t.
Table 5 reports the mean, median, standard deviation, and probability sets of the structural
and non structural parameters estimates obtained with the RWM algorithm. Figures 8 and
9 summarize this information visually by plotting the prior distribution (dashed line) and
the posterior one (solid line). Figures 6 and 7 show the Cumulative Sum Statistics for all
parameters, and indicate that convergence for all parameters is achieved after 300,000 draws.
Overall, most of the parameters are estimated to be signi¯cantly di®erent form zero.
Analyzing, ¯rst, the estimated stochastic processes, it appears that the variance of the
preference shock, ¾Â, is larger than the technology shock, ¾a, which is similar to what it is
found by Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007). The standard deviations of the tax shocks are
signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. Notably, the standard deviations of the measurement errors
are generally larger than structural shocks ones, implying that they are capturing a lot of
variation not explained by the model. Turning to behavioral parameters, the overall picture
is pretty much in line with what is available in the RBC literature.
Moving now to the ¯scal policy parameters, µf = ['w;'by;'y;Ãk;Ãby;Ãy], we can notice
that generally posterior standard deviations are smaller than the prior ones. The parame-
ters controlling government debt, 'by and Ãby, are greater than zero as one would expect;
since they are meant to avoid the explosiveness of public debt, the tax reaction should be
positively correlated to debt changes. The two taxes are weakly correlated. For our purpose
the most interesting parameters estimates are 'y and Ãy, which summarize the automatic
response of the ¯scal policy to cyclical conditions. The automatic response of the labor tax,
'y, is strictly positive, and we can rule out the possibility that these coe±cients are zero or
negative. This is clear when looking at plots of prior and posterior distributions (Figure 8
eight from top left); indeed, the left tail of the posterior assigns (almost) zero probability to
the event 'y · 0. This fact implies that the labor tax function is procyclical, corroborating
the idea that ¯scal policy has been countercyclical along the period considered. Figure 9
9I also tried with a nested version of the ¯scal policy rule, but I decided to not to present it. First, because
the marginal increase in the posterior density of the data is small. Second, more importantly parameters
estimation becomes problematic: parameter convergence is harder, and some parameters of the ¯scal policy
rule is not identi¯able.
16indicates that in most of the cases the posteriors of the ¯scal parameters do not overlap with
the priors, meaning that the ¯scal policy parameters are identi¯able.
The main focus of this paper is asses the ability of the tax policy to a®ect the volatility
of the macro variables. Therefore, the ¯rst check to do is to see how the model is able to
replicate standard deviations. Table 6 displays the data standard deviation and the model
100*SD c y n i
Raw data 26.51 23.62 7.32 39.40
Full model raw data 21.15(13.78) 18.64(9.48) 19.17(10.75) 41.26(28.95)
Cyclical data 0.65 0.82 0.86 2.24
Full model cyclical data 0.69(0.06) 0.72(0.09) 1.10(0.08) 2.45(0.22)
¿k ¿k by g
Raw data 3.46 2.81 13.11 10.93
Full model raw data 7.82(3.66) 9.81(5.34) 10.67(5.37) 8.97(4.66)
Cyclical Data 0.78 1.18 0.69 0.94
Full model cyclical data 1.08(0.08) 1.25(0.10) 0.76(0.06) 0.91(0.07)
Table 2: Data standard deviation and Model standard deviations. Standard deviations are
in % terms in parenthesis.
standard deviations. The ¯rst two rows show standard deviation computed on raw data,
the last two row standard deviation computed on cyclical data. In general, model statistics
are constructed by simulating the full model using one every 1,000 draws of MCMC chain
after discarding the ¯rst 300,000. Overall, the model does a good job in replicating standard
deviations. The only exception is the volatility of hours worked, where the model over-
estimates the standard deviation both at cyclical and non cyclical frequencies. Figure 2
plots the autocorrelations function for the observables. The model is able to replicate the
ACF for raw data with the only exception being ¿k. Moreover, the ACF of the model cyclical
component seizes pretty well the autocorrelation function of the ¯ltered data, see Figure 3.
The only exception is debt-GDP ratio, whose cyclical persistence is not captured by the
model. Overall, the model has a good ¯t and provides an adequate framework for policy
analysis.
6 Tax Policies and Stabilization
The question addressed in this paper is whether US tax policies helped to reduce °uctuations.





























































Figure 2: ACF for raw variables data and in the model (solid line mean estimates, dashed
line 90% probability sets).
there is an endogenous or 'systematic' channel, by which the policymakers automatically
respond to cyclical °uctuation, and I identi¯ed it with the two coe±cients in the ¯scal policy
rule 'y, Ãy. The second channel is through the orthogonal part of the ¯scal policies rule.
The estimated tax responses are
e ¿
w
t = 0:39e ¿
w





t = 0:38e ¿
k
t¡1 + 0:54yt + 0:24e byt + ²
k
t
The task here is to see whether they are important in in°uencing the amplitude of °uctu-
ations both at cyclical and non cyclical frequencies, and if shutting them would a®ect the
volatility of the macro variables. So, the question is: what happens to the standard devia-
tions of GDP, consumption, investment and hours worked if I set these coe±cients to zero,
i.e. 'y = Ãy = 0. Unfortunately, standard counterfactuals can not be performed. With the
mean, the median or the mode of the posterior distributions of the parameters and setting
'y = Ãy = 0, the model can not be solved. Thus, data can not be simulated or theoretical
moments can not be computed. To overcome this problem, I experiment two roads: (a)
compute the standard deviations for 'y ! 0 and Ãy ! 0, (b) perform counterfactuals a lµ a
Canova and Gambetti (2009), where structural parameters are re-estimated with the con-















































Figure 3: ACF for cyclical variables in the data and in the model (solid line mean estimates,
dashed line 90% probability sets).
and hours worked if we move away from the median estimates of the FP parameters. With
respect to the vertical red line, towards left I reduce the ¯scal policy parameters, viceversa
toward right (notice that the scales of the left and the right part are di®erent). Each point in
the blue line represent the standard deviation associated to a policy change. The standard
deviation is an average over 100 simulated data sets. For all the policy changes, I use the
same set of draws from the white noise innovations so that the di®erences among policies do
not arise from di®erent stochastic realizations.
Clearly, the negative slopes indicates that the more we approach zero the bigger the standard
deviations become. From the graph, it stands out that GDP is reacting less relative to the
other variable to change in policy. The remaining variables display a signi¯cant increase in
standard deviation; the percentage increase is 26% for consumption, 93% for hours worked,
82% for investment. Similar results apply at cyclical frequencies (see Figure 5) even thought
the results are less signi¯cant. The increase in standard deviation is 2% for GDP, 3% for
consumption, 8% for hours worked, 27% for investment. However, these are standard devi-
ation computed for positive values of 'y and Ãy, that are relatively far from zero; precisely,
we can not compute standard deviations for values of ¯scal policy parameters smaller than
0.17. Overall, we can be relatively con¯dent that the relation between volatility of macro
variables and values of 'y and Ãy is negative.
To explore to what extent the absence of countercyclical ¯scal policy is important to smooth





































Figure 4: Blue line standard deviation of raw variables with a ¯scal policy change. The
intersection between the red an the blue line shows the standard deviation of the model
using the median estimates. Moving toward left we reduce the values of 'y and Ãy, viceversa
toward right. Notice that right and left scale are di®erent.
°uctuations we need to re-estimate the model. I try to answer to four questions: (1) does
the volatility increase if 'y = Ãy = 0 ? (2) with a balanced budget assumption and no lump
sum transfers is it still true that the volatility increase if 'y = Ãy = 0 ? (3) Which of the
two tax instrument, labor or capital tax, is more important to reduce °uctuations ? (4) Do
¯scal policy shocks matter ? Table 3 collects the answers to the previous questions. The ¯rst
half of the table presents the standard deviations computed at business cycles frequencies,
and the second half reports the standard deviations computed on raw data. The ¯rst row
reports the data standard deviations, the second row (fm) the standard deviation of the full
model, and the third row (r1) the standard deviations with 'y = Ãy = 0. The fourth row
(r2) report the standard deviation assuming a Balanced Budget assumption. To replicate
a balanced budget assumption I assume that tax besides reacting to GDP is very sensitive
to debt °uctuations. Setting the coe±cients of debt-GDP ratio, 'y and Ãy, to 5, we are
imposing a strong reaction of the tax to debt variations. This mimics a Balance Budget
assumption where debt does not °uctuate along the cycles and the government budged con-
straint is adjusted by tax variations. Figure 10 plot the implied path of debt where the
FP parameters are set to large values. Clearly, the implied path of debt-GDP is much less
volatile with respect to the median estimates, i.e. 'by = 0:86 and Ãby = 0:24. The ¯fth
row collects the standard deviations assuming no cyclical reaction for the labor tax, 'y = 0,







































Figure 5: Blue line standard deviation of cyclical variables with a ¯scal policy change. The
intersection between the red an the blue line shows the standard deviation of the model
using the median estimates. Moving toward left we reduce the values of 'y and Ãy, viceversa
toward right. Notice that right and left scale are di®erent.
and the sixth row the standard deviations assuming no cyclical reaction for the capital tax,
Ãy = 0. Finally, the seventh row shows the standard deviations without ¯scal policy shocks.
The second part of the Table re-do the exercise using raw data.
Contrasting (fm) and (r1), we can notice that the standard deviations of GDP, consumption
and investment increase considerably if omit the cyclical reaction of the tax. This is some-
how expectable given the previous analysis. Hour worked is quite insensitive to changes in
policies. Indeed, along all the speci¯cations hours worked standard deviation ranges between
1.01 to 1.11, so it is unlikely that ¯scal policy a®ects the volatility of hours worked. It is
interesting to disentangle to impact of the two taxes on the volatility of GDP, consumption
and investment. Confronting (r4) and (r5), it seems that the labor tax cyclical reaction in-
°uence volatilities more than the capital tax. Concerning the exogenous channel, tax shocks
virtually have no impact on standard deviations. The latter ¯nding is consistent with what
is found in the narrative approach of Romer and Romer (2007), where they show that ¯scal
shocks explain 9% of GDP growth rate volatility. Finally, Balance Budget rule o®sets com-
pletely the stabilizing role of ¯scal policy. In fact, contrasting (r2) and (r3) there are no clear
di®erences in terms of standard deviations with or without countercyclical ¯scal policy. So,
by omitting debt we are mismeasuring the impact of tax policy on volatilities. The second
part of the table shows the changes of standard deviations with raw data, and results are
21c y n i
Cyclical Data 0.65 0.82 0.86 2.24
fm: Full model 0.69 0.73 1.11 2.48
r1: 'y = Ãy = 0 2.28 1.33 1.01 3.45
r2: 'by = Ãby = 5 0.77 0.73 1.14 2.65
r3: 'by = Ãby = 5 and 'y = Ãy = 0 0.83 0.74 1.13 3.02
r4: 'y = 0 2.08 1.38 1.05 3.70
r5: Ãy = 0 0.68 0.72 1.07 2.63
ns: ¾w = ¾k = 0 0.69 0.73 1.11 2.47
Raw Data 26.5 23.6 7.3 39.4
fm: Full model 25.4 19.2 18.2 44.1
r1: 'y = Ãy = 0 71.7 40.4 12.9 46.2
r2: 'by = Ãby = 5 30.4 25.3 19.5 51.5
r3: 'by = Ãby = 5 and 'y = Ãy = 0 32.5 16.0 55.6 75.3
r4: 'y = 0 62.9 37.8 11.4 55.7
r5: Ãy = 0 45.8 33.7 19.7 87.7
ns: ¾w = ¾k = 0 21.7 18.3 16.9 37.7
Table 3: Standard deviations with di®erent restrictions.
very similar.
Concluding, this analysis suggests that the countercyclical reaction of ¯scal policy is impor-
tant for smoothing °uctuations both at cyclical and non cyclical frequencies.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, I study whether US tax policies a®ected the volatility of the macro variables
both at cyclical and non cyclical frequencies. There are endogenous feedbacks between
economic activity and tax policies; on the one hand, the latter directly a®ects household
decisions in°uencing consumption and labor choices, and therefore economic activity. On
the other hand, the ¯scal authority sets the tax policy by responding to cyclical conditions
of the economy. The task of this work was to estimate from the data the feedbacks between
economic activity and tax policies, and in particular to test whether tax policies are useful in
reducing economic volatility. To answer the question of interest, I chose to employ a General
Equilibrium model that provides a theoretical framework to identify endogenous interactions.
I found that tax policies helped to reduce economic volatility when the government has no
balanced budget constraint. In particular, the automatic response to cyclical conditions
has been very important in shaping macroeconomic stability; indeed, if we assume that the
22labor and capital taxes do not respond to GDP variations, the volatility of the main macro
variables would increase. I also found that unexpected changes in the tax policy do not
a®ect much the economic volatility.
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26A Steady State Analysis
I shall indicate the variable without time subscript as the variable at the steady state. From
the Euler equation, (6) and (7), we get that
1 = ¯R




+ 1 ¡ ±
Therefore, 1=¯ = (1 ¡ ¿k)®[K










Moreover, from the intertemporal optimality condition, equation (5), we get that
C




At the non stochastic steady state, the exogenous process are identical to 1, X = G =
V = A = 1. Thus the law of motion for capital, equation (4), becomes
I = ±K
and the feasibility constraint,
1
Y






which can be rewritten as
Y =
1 + C
1 ¡ ± K
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(1 ¡ ®)¿w + ®¿k ¡ 1
Y
(1 ¡ ¿k)®[K
Y ]¡1 ¡ ±
27B Log-linearization of the equilibrium conditions.
In this part, I develop the log linearization of the equations that characterize the economy.
Except for some cases (taxes and interest rate), I denote the log deviation of a variable Xt
from its steady state path, X (without time subscript), with small letter, i.e.
xt = ln(Xt=X):






At the non stochastic steady state we have that the variables are constant and the shock are
zero; the log linear version is obtained by dividing the equation by its value at steady state
and by taking logarithm; i.e.
yt = at + ®kt¡1 + (1 ¡ ®)nt
The log linearized version of equation (5) is as follow
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where I denote with b ¿w
t the log deviation of the tax on labor income from its steady state




¿w. The latter equation can be rewritten as
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using (??), the expression simpli¯es to
´ct = ¡
1
1 ¡ ¿we ¿
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¿j for j = w;k. The log linearized version
of the Euler equation can be derived by applying a ¯rst order approximation to equation (6)










28where b rt = ln Rt
R . Using the fact that 1 = ¯R the previous equation can be simpli¯ed to
0 = Etfvt + ´(ct ¡ ct+1) + b rt+1g (21)
The interest rate equation, (7)
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Using the steady state equation for the interest rate, i.e. ¹ = ®(1 ¡ ¿k) Y
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¹ + 1 ¡ ±
vt (22)
and combining the two equations, i.e. (22) and (21), we get
0 = Etfvt + ´(ct ¡ ct+1) +
¹
¹ + 1 ¡ ±
(yt+1 ¡ kt ¡
1




¹ + 1 ¡ ±
vt+1g
Recall the government budget constraint, i.e.
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t ]Yt + Bt (23)
where the latter equality is obtained by substituting the optimality condition of the ¯rm.
Rewriting it in terms of the debt-GDP ratio Bt=Yt
Gt
Yt



































































t = vt¡1 + Rb rt = vt¡1 + ¹(yt ¡ kt¡1 ¡
¿k
1 ¡ ¿kb ¿
k
t ) ¡ (1 ¡ ±)vt (25)
where the last equality follows from equation (22). We can get rid of the bond interest
rate and express the government budget constraint in terms of GDP, debt-GDP, taxes and
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Simplifying and rearranging the terms we obtain
G
Y
gt + ¸4yt¡1 + ¸4 e byt¡1 = e byt + (1 ¡ ®)e ¿
w
t + ¸1e ¿
k
t + ¸2yt + ¸3kt¡1 +
B
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[(1 ¡ ±)vt ¡ vt¡1]
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B=Y Finally, the log linear
version of the feasibility constrain is











and the log linear version of he law of motion of capital is
IV it + IV vt = Kkt ¡ (1 ¡ ±)Kkt¡1: (26)
where V = 1 at the non stochastic steady state.
30C Tax Series construction.
I use quarterly values for real series of gdp, consumption, hours worked, investment, govern-
ment debt and government spending. Except taxes, all the times series are taken from the
FRED database (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/);
average tax rate are constructed from the times series of the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(www.bea.gov). The hours worked are constructed as follows: I took the average weekly
hours (Average Weekly Hours of Production Worker) and I normalized to 1 unit measure.
Then, I multiply the series for the level of employment (All Employees), and divide by the
population (Total Population). The series of investment is the sum of Fixed Investment plus
Durable Consumption. Government spending is the real Government Consumption series.
To calculate the average tax rates, I follow closely Mendoza et al. (1994). All these items





W + PRI=2 + CI
CI = PRI=2 + RI + CP + NI
where
FIT = Federal Income taxes (3.2: line 3);
SIT = State and local income taxes (3.3: line 3);
W = Wages and salaries (1.14: line 5);
CI = Capital income;
PRI = Proprietor's income (1.14: line 13);
RI = Rental income (1.14: line 17);
CP = Corporate pro¯ts (1.14: line 11);
NI = Net interest (1.14: line 25).
As discussed by Joines (1981), the division of proprietor's income into capital and income
is somewhat arbitrary. Joines analyzes both cases, I follow Jones (2002), who takes 'a middle
ground' and splits proprietor's income evenly between capital and labor income. The labor
tax rate, taxw, is then calculated as
tax
w =
¿p(W + PRI=2) + CSI
PRI=2 + EC
where
CSI = Total contributions to social insurance (3.1: line 7);
31EC = Total employee compensation (1.14: line 4).
In addition to wages and salaries, employee compensation includes contribution to social
insurance and untaxed bene¯ts. Tax capital rate is calculated as
tax
k =
¿pCI + CT + PT
PT + CI
where
CT = Corporate taxes (3.1: line 5);
PT = Property taxes (3.3:line 9).
32º Parameters Description F ¹ ¾
® capital share B(18;20) 0.5 0.1
´ inverse of intert elasticity ¡(2;1:25) 2.5 1.8
K
Y steady state N(2:5;0:1) 2.5 0.1
¿w steady state B(4;18) 0.2 0.1
¿k steady state B(2;18) 0.1 0.1
'w labor tax autoreg N(0:2;0:5) 0.2 0.5
'by labor tax response to debt-GDP N(0:2;0:5) 0.2 0.5
'y labor tax response to debt-GDP N(0:2;0:5) 0.2 0.5
Ãk capital tax autoreg N(0:2;0:5) 0.2 0.5
Ãby capial tax response to debt-GDP N(0:2;0:5) 0.2 0.5
Ãy capital tax response to debt-GDP N(0:2;0:5) 0.2 0.5
½a AR technology B(18;8) 0.7 0.1
½g AR government B(18;8) 0.7 0.1
½Â AR preference B(18;8) 0.7 0.1
½v AR investment B(18;8) 0.7 0.1
¾a SD technology U(0;1) 0.5 0.3
¾Â SD preference U(0;1) 0.5 0.3
¾v SD investment U(0;1) 0.5 0.3
¾w SD labor tax U(0;1) 0.5 0.3
¾k SD capital tax U(0;1) 0.5 0.3
¾g SD government U(0;1) 0.5 0.3
¾mw SD meas ¿w U(0;1) 0.5 0.3




j SD trend U(0;1) 0.5 0.3
#fd
°j Drifts N(0;1) 0.0 1.0
¾
´
j SD trends U(0;1) 0.5 0.3
µlt
Bj Slopes N(0;1) 0.0 1.0
¾
´
j SD trends U(0;1) 0.5 0.3
Table 4: Prior Distribution for the parameter º
33º mean median sd 95% 5%
® 0.461 0.458 0.010 0.479 0.449
´ 1.266 1.272 0.037 1.313 1.192
k=y 3.368 3.400 0.087 3.477 3.244
¿w 0.458 0.460 0.028 0.497 0.414
¿k 0.273 0.273 0.023 0.310 0.236
Áw 0.395 0.377 0.067 0.520 0.302
Áby 0.866 0.865 0.038 0.926 0.803
Áy 0.470 0.467 0.037 0.526 0.410
Ãk 0.381 0.383 0.029 0.426 0.333
Ãby 0.243 0.261 0.059 0.306 0.118
Ãy 0.545 0.554 0.049 0.605 0.440
½a 0.719 0.724 0.069 0.805 0.609
½g 0.586 0.597 0.048 0.648 0.478
½Â 0.708 0.715 0.043 0.773 0.627
½v 0.572 0.571 0.067 0.674 0.452
¾a 0.048 0.045 0.017 0.078 0.023
¾Â 0.089 0.088 0.030 0.144 0.043
¾º 0.490 0.489 0.036 0.551 0.437
¾g 0.783 0.780 0.055 0.883 0.691
¾»w 0.153 0.150 0.045 0.240 0.083
¾»k 0.095 0.091 0.032 0.149 0.051
¾mw 0.895 0.904 0.090 1.007 0.751
¾mk 1.099 1.126 0.153 1.302 0.806
¾c 0.364 0.364 0.036 0.425 0.306
¾y 0.610 0.610 0.034 0.668 0.557
¾n 0.831 0.828 0.047 0.904 0.755
¾i 0.336 0.346 0.181 0.625 0.055
¾¿w 0.229 0.184 0.175 0.564 0.019
¾¿k 0.359 0.267 0.287 0.883 0.016
¾by 0.127 0.112 0.095 0.299 0.011
¾g 0.908 0.906 0.053 0.992 0.826
°c 0.468 0.475 0.185 0.749 0.129
°y 0.420 0.421 0.107 0.584 0.229
°n 0.227 0.214 0.184 0.564 -0.077
°i 0.597 0.604 0.422 1.230 -0.240
°¿w 0.065 0.067 0.096 0.230 -0.094
°¿k -0.001 0.011 0.133 0.189 -0.242
°by 0.176 0.169 0.091 0.322 0.023
°g 0.173 0.169 0.076 0.307 0.048
Table 5: Parameters Estimates with Speci¯cation S1 with ¯lter fd. Standard deviations are
expressed in percentage terms.
34Table 6: Data standard deviation and Model standard deviations. Standard deviations are
in % terms in parenthesis.
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Figure 6: Convergence Statistics for structural parameters: cumulative sum of draws.
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Figure 7: Convergence Statistics for non structural parameters: cumulative sum of draws.










































































































































Figure 8: Prior and Posterior distributions for structural parameters. The solid lines repre-
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Figure 9: Prior and Posterior distributions for non structural parameters. The solid lines
represent the posterior and the dotted lines the prior.














Figure 10: Blue line represent the debt-DGP ratio impled by the full model (fm), the red
line the debt-DGP ratio implied by a model with 'by = Ãby = 5 (r2). The debt-GDP ratio
path is the average among 100 simulations using the median values of posterior estimates.
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